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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
State 
 
Colorado 
 
Combs v. Jaguar Energy Serv., LLC, No. 1:15-cv-
00815-REB-NYW, 2016 WL 2931607 (D. Colo. May 
17, 2016). 
 
Oil field workers brought a putative class action against 
an employer, claiming the employer failed to pay 
proper overtime under the Colorado Wage Act 
(“CWA”). The district court granted the employer’s 
motion for summary judgment, finding that the oil field 
workers “were exempt from the CWA’s overtime pay 
requirement under exemption for interstate drivers, 
driver helpers, and loaders of motor carriers.” 
 
Louisiana 
 
Square Mile Energy, LLC v. Pommier, 2015-807 (La. 
App. 3 Cir. June 1, 2016). 
 
A husband inherited mineral rights as a co-owner with 
his siblings.  Prior to divorce, the husband and wife 
signed an agreement with an operator to partition their 
community property. Following their divorce, the 
operator brought a concursus proceeding to determine 
mineral ownership of that tract. A clause in the 
agreement stated, “Included in this transfer are any and 
all mineral rights, when available, to [wife] and all 
surface rights.” The husband and wife disagreed on 
whether that transfer included minerals the husband 
inherited with his siblings. The trial court ruled that the 
phrase “when available” rendered the clause ambiguous 
and then determined that the partition agreement did not 
intend to convey the inherited minerals. The appellate 
court affirmed despite the clause’s lack of express 
reservation of the minerals: the minerals were not 
“available” at the time the husband signed the partition 
agreement because he “was a co-owner in indivision of 
a mineral servitude with his siblings.” 
 
Massachusetts  
 
Melrose Fish & Game Club, Inc. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline 
Co., LLC, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 594 (2016). 
  
A hunting and fishing club filed suit against a gas 
pipeline company alleging the company interfered with 
its easement. The trial court granted the company’s 
motion for summary judgment. The club appealed. The 
Court of Appeals found that the club possessed an 
easement by estoppel. The Court did not agree with the 
 
 
company’s claim that paving a portion of the 
easement frustrated its purpose. Thus, the trial court 
erred by granting summary judgment, and the Court 
remanded the case. 
 
Missouri 
 
Lake Ozark-Osage Beach Joint Sewer Bd. v. Missouri 
Dep't of Nat. Res., Land Reclamation Comm'n & 
Magruder Limestone Co., No. WD 78869, 2016 WL 
3268221 (Mo. Ct. App. June 14, 2016). 
 
Missouri’s land commission granted a permit to mine 
about 700 feet from a city sewage treatment plant. 
The plant appealed, alleging the commission failed to 
accept all the recommended conditions, modified a 
condition without publishing a fact-finding report, 
and helped the mining company meet its burden of 
proof to gain a permit. The court held that the 
commission has the power to make decisions about 
conditions and therefore is not required to accept all 
or any of the recommended conditions. Additionally, 
the court determined the fact-finding report was not 
required because the referenced provision became 
effective after the commission’s decision was final: 
the commission’s published minutes explained its 
reasoning for changing the wording (but not the 
content) of the modified condition. Finally, the court 
used the Saxony decision to determine that the 
commission may apply reasonable conditions that 
better allowed a company to meet its burden of proof 
and gain permit approval. The court upheld the 
mining company’s permit.  
 
North Dakota 
 
Holverson v. Lundberg, 879 N.W.2d 718 (N.D. 
2016). 
 
A trust had agreed to sale property; after some 
payment, the trust released five acres to the grantee 
but held a mortgage on the land until the grantee paid 
the remainder. The mortgagee could not repay the 
mortgage by the maturity date, so the trust gave a 
notice of default and allowed the mortgagee six 
months the cure the default. When the mortgagee 
tendered his last payment, the trust declined it 
because it was past the initial maturity date. The 
mortgagee filed a quiet title action, and the trust 
counterclaimed with fraud and breach of contract 
because the mortgagee had taken multiple mortgages 
on that property and had satisfied many of those. The 
lower court granted summary judgment to the 
mortgagee and found that, since the trust had 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss2/4
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accepted late payments for more than thirty years, the 
trust had waived the “time is of the essence” clause. 
The trust appealed. The Supreme Court of North 
Dakota affirmed; by amending the mortgage to grant a 
six-month curative extension, the trustee was charged 
as a matter of law with constructive notice of the 
county’s property records for that tract, which included 
the other mortgages, some of which were satisfied at 
the time. Although the mortgagee continued to make 
sporadic payment to the trust, the trust’s counterclaims 
of fraudulent misrepresentation accrued starting with 
the trustee’s notice of the property records. Therefore, 
the statute of limitations barred these counterclaims.  
 
Texas 
 
Adams v. Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co.-USA, No. 04-15-
00118-CV, 2016 WL 3342353 (Tex. App. June 15, 
2016). 
 
Lessors filed a breach of contract claim against a 
producer for failing to drill an offset well according to 
the leases. The district court granted summary judgment 
for the producer, and the lessor appealed. The parties 
disagreed about whether the well drilled was an offset 
well per the terms of the lease; legal standards dictate 
that operators should drill offset wells close enough to 
original wells to prevent drainage to the original well. 
The lease agreement, however, provided no maximum 
distance of an offset well from an original well. The 
lessors claim the well should be closer to the triggering 
well, but the producer alleged the well was drilled 
correctly based on the characteristics of the Eagle Ford 
Basin. The distance between the offset well and the 
original well remains in dispute, so the court overturned 
the summary judgement and reversed and remanded the 
case to the determine the correct distance.  
 
Escondido Res. II, LLC v. Justapor Ranch Co., L.C., 
04-14-00905-CV, 2016 WL 2936411 (Tex. App. May 
18, 2016). 
 
An oil and gas lessor brought action against a lessee 
seeking damages for breach of contract, termination of 
the lease, trespass, and trespass to try title, alleging the 
lessee intentionally paid less royalty than agreed upon, 
and therefore, the lease had terminated. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the breach of contract claim; the 
lessee did not comply with the true-up provision, which 
required the lessee to rectify any deficiency in 
payments by a certain date of each year. But the 
court held the lease’s termination provision did not 
apply to a breach of contract. The court held for the 
lessee on the trespass and trespass to try title claims 
since those claims relied on the termination of the 
lease due to the breach of contract. Finally, the Court 
remanded a second breach of contract claim that the 
trial court never addressed because the trial court had 
held the lease had terminated by that point.  
 
Unocal Pipeline Co. v. BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc., 
No. 01-15-00266-CV, 2016 WL 2929095 (Tex. App. 
May 17, 2016). 
 
A partner in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System 
(“TAPS”) gave notice of its withdrawal in TAPS, and 
the remaining partners wanted to split the company’s 
shares. The company insisted that taking those shares 
also meant the remaining partners would become 
responsible for the company’s dismantlement, 
removal, and restoration (“DR&R”) requirements of 
the TAPS federal right-of-way. The remaining 
partners disagreed. Additionally, the parties disagreed 
about whether the company would have to pay the 
remaining operators if the net salvage value (“NSV”) 
was negative. The lower court ruled that the company 
remained liable for its DR&R obligations and that the 
company’s NSV claim was not ripe because the 
parties could not agree on the calculation of the NSV. 
The appellate court reversed and remanded: although 
the TAPS agreement did not name or even include 
the right-of-way, the nature of TAPS requires any 
party desiring to exit the TAPS agreement to transfer 
interest in “all fee titles, easements, leases, permits, 
rights-of-way, [etc.]” Because the right-of-way is 
required for TAPS to continue efficient operation, 
that interest must transfer with the stock. The right-
of-way does not conflict with the TAPS agreement as 
it only requires transferees to demonstrate their 
ability to perform the transferring party’s obligations 
that may arise after the company discontinues 
operations. Finally, the court held that the company’s 
“shall pay” claim was ripe; the court remanded the 
case for the lower court to interpret the clause, but the 
determination of the NSV would be left to arbitration, 
per the TAPS agreement. 
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS 
 
 
Federal 
 
9th Circuit 
 
Idaho Conservation League v. Bonneville Power 
Admin., 12-70338, 2016 WL 3430538 (9th Cir. June 21, 
2016). 
 
The Army Corps of Engineers and a power 
administration (“agencies”) jointly operated a dam. The 
agencies wanted to change the method of operating the 
dam and performed an environmental assessment to 
determine whether the agencies could release the dam 
and alter the lake level in the winter. The National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires agencies 
to create an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) 
that examines environmental consequences of “major” 
federal action. An environmental group argued that the 
agencies did not create an EIS, thereby violating NEPA.  
The Court of Appeals determined the agencies did not 
violate NEPA because the slight manipulation of the 
dam level did not constitute major federal action. 
 
State 
 
California  
 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 
247 Cal. App. 4th 326, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898 (2016). 
 
A water district performed an environmental impact 
report (“EIR”) for a proposal to pump groundwater 
from an underground aquifer in the Mojave Desert then 
approved that proposal. Various conservation agencies 
challenged the approval, arguing that plan involved 
inefficient pumping because some water pumped from 
the aquifer would evaporate and that the EIR’s 
stipulations on extending the timeline of the pumping 
were too abstract for approval. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the water district’s decision because, despite 
evaporation, water would be conserved in other 
methods, and because any future extension of the 
timeline of the program would require a separate EIR.  
 
Del. Tetra Techs., Inc. v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 247 
Cal. App. 4th 352, 355-56, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 145 
(2016).  
 
A salt mining company petitioned for a writ of mandate 
against the county for approving a memorandum of 
understanding (“MOA”) without performing a 
necessary environmental impact report (“EIR”). 
According to the California Environmental Quality Act,  
 
any project requires an EIR before approval, and the 
company believed the MOA to be a project because it 
discussed a plan to pump between 50,000 to 75,000 
acre-feet of water every year from an underground 
aquifer to sell to other municipalities. The run-off 
from the aquifer currently goes to dry lakes where the 
water becomes highly salinated and then evaporates. 
The company currently mines the dry lakes and 
believes the plan will minimize runoff and thus harm 
its mining capabilities. The court approved the lower 
court’s finding that the MOA is not a project itself, as 
it establishes a process for plan completion and 
approval, which does not commit the county to any 
further action. Because the MOA is not a project, it 
does not require an EIR; therefore, the court upheld 
the denial of a writ of mandate.  
 
Colorado  
 
Upper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Wolfe, 2016 CO 
42, 371 P.3d 681. 
 
A water authority diverted water from a river for 
beneficial use. No other claims on the river existed. 
The water authority then allocated a portion of the 
initial diversion to a junior water rights holder with 
conditional use and filed an application to make the 
junior water rights holder’s diversion absolute.  
Various engineers claimed that the water authority 
could not vest a junior water rights holder’s 
conditional right as absolute when the authority 
simultaneously owned the senior water rights. The 
Supreme Court of Colorado held that when no waste, 
mischief, hoarding, or injury to other water users 
exists, an owner of water rights may choose which 
water rights it makes absolute and remanded the case 
to the water court to allow the senior rights holder to 
grant the junior water holders with absolute use. 
 
Montana 
 
Eldorado Coop Canal Co. v. Hoge, 2016 MT 145. 
 
Due to the water court’s ongoing adjudication of 
existing water rights in the Teton River Basin, the 
water court issued a temporary preliminary decree 
declaring certain appropriators subject to a new 
volume metric, amending a 100-year-old decree. 
Downstream water users (not subject to the earlier 
decree) informed the water commissioner that the 
prior appropriator was nearing that volume limitation 
and asked the commissioner to cap the use. The prior 
appropriator then filed a dissatisfied user complaint 
requesting to return to the earlier decree. The water 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss2/4
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court denied that request, and this appeal followed. The 
Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the decision, 
finding that the “district court had correctly instructed 
the water commission to distribute owner’s water rights 
pursuant to modified portion of temporary preliminary 
decree” and that the decree did not violate the water 
rights owner’s right to due process. 
 
Oklahoma 
 
Logan Cty. Conservation Dist. v. Pleasant Oaks 
Homeowners Ass’n, 2016 OK 65. 
 
A water conservation district filed suit seeking a 
declaratory judgment allowing it to perform repairs and 
improvements to a floodwater retarding structure based 
on vested easement access. A homeowner’s association, 
however, maintained that the repairs and improvements 
did not fall within the scope of the easements. Thus, the 
association alleged that the project would constitute a 
taking and require compensation to homeowners. Both 
parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the 
judge sustained the conservation district’s motion. The 
association appealed. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
determined that the instruments that granted the 
easements authorized repairs and improvements and 
affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Carolina 
 
W. Anderson Water Dist. v. City of Anderson, No. 
2014-002488, 2016 WL 3342245 (S.C. Ct. App. June 
15, 2016). 
 
A water district appealed the circuit court's decision 
to allow a city to provide water service to a 
site within the district's boundaries.  The Court of 
Appeals found that the city’s purchase and sale 
agreement included the district consenting to the city 
providing water to a site partially within the district’s 
historical boundaries because the agreement named 
the site and did not distinguish between parts inside 
or outside those boundaries. Further, the district’s 
board could make that agreement because it did not 
substantially compromise the district’s primary 
function—it only delegated its duties to one site for a 
limited time. Even so, the water district’s past board 
had given consent, and the Court held that the new 
board could take another vote to continue with that 
agreement.  
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SELECTED WIND DECISIONS
 
Federal 
 
8th Circuit 
 
North Dakota v. Heydinger, No. 14-2156, 2016 WL 
3343639 (8th Cir. June 15, 2016). 
 
A Minnesota statute prohibited importing 
extraterritorial power from a new facility or entering a 
long-term purchase agreement “that would increase 
statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions.” 
Nonprofit cooperatives that provide rural and 
municipal electricity sued the State, claiming the 
statute violated the Commerce Clause. The district 
court held that the prohibitions were indeed 
“impermissible extraterritorial legislation” violating 
the dormant Commerce Clause. The cooperatives meet 
the necessary challenge of providing reliable and cost-
effective power to rural communities across several 
states; to best meet the needs of each area, these 
cooperatives cannot plan for individual emissions  
 
 
regulations of each state but rather must plan for the 
overall emissions limits allowed in that facility. The 
Eighth Circuit affirmed because the State was 
regulating activity wholly outside Minnesota. If the 
State takes issue with out-of-state emissions, the Clean 
Air Act provides recourse through several mechanisms 
that do not violate the Commerce Clause. 
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SELECTED AGRICULTURE DECISIONS
 
Federal 
 
11th Circuit 
 
Cannon v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 15-12325, 
2016 WL 2849459 (11th Cir. 2016). 
  
An agriculture lessee received subsidies through the 
United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”). 
The Farm Service Agency determined the lessor did 
not own the entire farm. The USDA ordered the lessee 
to repay the subsidies received for the portion of land 
the lessor did not own. The lessee filed an Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) claim against the 
USDA secretary, but the lower court dismissed the 
claim as time-barred. The lessee’s claim accrued 
almost three years before he sued despite a two-year 
statute of limitations. The legislature extended the 
statute to five years, and the lessee filed suit again. An 
amended statute of limitations retroactively applies to 
a cause of action that accrued prior to, but was filed 
after, the amendment went into effect only when (1) 
the limitations statute is remedial or procedural in 
nature and not a substantive limitation on a statutory 
right or (2) the legislature clearly manifested an intent 
to have an amended limitations statute apply to 
existing causes of action. The Court held that (1) 
ECOA’s limitation period was substantive rather than 
remedial or procedural since the limitation restricted a 
right of action created by a statute, and (2) Congress 
did not manifest an intent to have ECOA’s amended 
statute apply to existing causes of action. Thus, the 
Court held ECOA’s extended limitations period did 
not apply retroactively to lessee’s claims. 
 
State 
 
Michigan 
 
Lyle Schmidt Farms LLC v. Township of Mendon, 
Nos. 326609, 326611, 327909, 327916, 2016 WL 
3263911 (Mich. Ct. App. June 14, 2016). 
 
A purchaser filed suit against a township due to an ad 
valorem tax valuation dispute. The previous purchaser 
bought the properties from a bank then resold them 
without filing affidavits affirming the property’s status 
as agricultural property, which caps the taxable value 
of the property. The purchasers protested the taxable 
values at local boards of review and the Michigan Tax 
Tribunal (MTT); in both instances, the reviewing 
bodies denied the protests. The purchasers filed an 
appeal consolidating  
 
 
the protested cases. The Court of Appeals held that the 
MTT did not err in only allowing current, and not 
former, agricultural owners to file an affidavit under 
Michigan law. Ultimately, the Court denied the 
request to recap parcels. 
 
North Carolina 
 
Myers v. Clodfelter, No. COA15-1307, 2016 WL 
3156124 (N.C. Ct. App. June 7, 2016). 
 
A homeowner and a field owner own adjacent 
properties and share a common road, which is the only 
access to and from the field owner’s property. When 
the field owner put a commercial paintball field on his 
property, the homeowner dug a ditch across the road 
where it crossed into the field to prevent access. The 
field owner sued, claiming he, through his 
predecessors in title, had a perpetual prescriptive 
easement across the homeowner’s property because of 
open, continuous, notorious, and hostile use of the 
path for over twenty years. The homeowner responded 
that the field owner bought his property from the 
homeowner’s relatives, whose use of the land was not 
open or hostile. The court found that both the 
predecessor’s and current field owner’s history of 
open use and maintenance of the road showed 
evidence that both parties who had owned the field 
assumed the use of the road was a right—not a 
privilege—meaning the hostility had existed for over 
twenty years. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling that the field owner had a prescriptive 
easement over the homeowner’s property that the 
homeowner cannot block.  
 
Utah 
 
Anderson v. Fautin, 2016 UT 22. 
 
A landowner brought a quiet title action against an 
adjoining landowner over ownership of a strip of land 
on the defendant’s side of the fence—a fence that 
encroached onto the plaintiff’s vacant lot. The plaintiff 
had failed to use or visit the vacant lot for twenty-six 
years. During that time, the defendant had used the 
land on the defendant’s side of the fence for grazing 
livestock. The lower court granted summary judgment 
for the defendant. The Supreme Court of Utah 
affirmed, stating that the defendant did not need to 
prove occupancy on both sides of the fence for a claim 
of boundary by acquiescence if the defendant could 
show occupation up to the fence. 
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For a more complete list of articles related to agricultural law, please consult the Agricultural Law Bibliography of 
the National Agricultural Law Center, http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/reporter/caseindexes/. This bibliography 
is updated quarterly and provides a comprehensive listing of agricultural law articles. 
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